Introduction 1
In most of the European welfare states the introduction of a guaranteed minimum income scheme has meant an important step in welfare state development. However, the time period in which these safety nets of last resort have been introduced as well as their shape and the level of protection they offer vary widely (e.g. Eardley et al., 1996; Van Mechelen, 2009 ). Furthermore, in many countries specific minimum income guarantees exist for different groups. Among others, this is often the case for persons that have reached the legal retirement age. Much research has focused on minimum income protection for ablebodied persons at working age (e.g. Immervoll, 2009 ). In contrast, minimum income guarantees targeted at the elderly have received much less attention in the international literature (for an exception, see Figari et al., 2008 ; as well as Pearson and Whitehouse, 2009) . Nonetheless, in all EU member states the elderly constitute a substantial part of the population, projected to grow on average from around 17% of the population in 2008 to 30% in 2060 (European Commission, 2009: 40-44) . In addition, the elderly stand out for their heavy reliance on social benefits.
A focus on minimum income guarantees for the elderly is justified for at least two reasons. First, the provision of adequate levels of retirement incomes to ensure that elderly people do not face a risk of falling into poverty is one of the core objectives of pension policy, both at the national and the European level (cf. Eckardt, 2005: 253-254; European Commission, 2010b) . Recently, this has been re-confirmed by the European Commission (2010d) in its Green paper on the future of pension reforms to ensure adequate, sustainable and safe pensions. Minimum income guarantees are a crucial part of old-age income provision in terms of avoiding poverty in old age, especially for persons with "incomplete" careers or low earnings throughout their working lives (e.g. European Commission, 2006: 56) . Second, in a substantial number of EU countries minimum income guarantees for the elderly are likely to become more important in the future due to a tendency in recent pension reforms to re-strengthen the link between contributions and benefits, a growing reliance on defined-contribution (private) pensions (with inherently more uncertainty about future benefit levels), a projected fall in public pension replacement rates in a good deal of EU member states as well as a growing reliance on price indexation of pensions in payment (e.g. European Commission, 2005; Social Protection Committee, 2006; Zaidi et al., 2006; Meyer et al., 2007; European Commission, 2009: 27-28; OECD, 2009; Whitehouse et al., 2009; European Commission, 2010b: 36) . Therefore, a good understanding of minimum income protection for the elderly is not only relevant for evaluating whether pension policy invests sufficiently in meeting one of its core objectives, but also for explaining cross-national and cross-temporary differences in old-age poverty.
Some countries have a long tradition of genuine minimum income protection for the elderly (e.g. the Netherlands and Denmark), whereas others have only recently introduced some minimum income guarantee targeted at the elderly (e.g. Romania). By the end of the 2000s, in all EU member states at least some form of minimum income guarantee existed for elderly persons. Nevertheless, recent changes and their impact on benefit levels have been left undocumented in the comparative welfare state literature. The purpose of this chapter is to analyze minimum income protection schemes targeted at the elderly population in the EU countries.
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social security literature, most characteristics can be grouped into four main dimensions: "mode of access" (a), "benefit structure" (b), "financing" (c), and "governance" (d) (cf. Titmuss, 1971; Reman, 1992; von Maydell, 1993; Ferrera, 1996; Schulte, 1998; Dixon, 1999; Clegg, 2008) . In this chapter, particular focus is devoted to those dimensions which affect most directly the adequacy of minimum income protection: the mode of access and the benefit structure, i.e. entitlement conditions and the structure and level of benefits. For an analysis of the financing and governance of minimum pension benefits, see Goedemé and Van Lancker (2009) . Both trends and the levels are analyzed, thus providing a comprehensive account of the latest developments and European diversity. The core question to be answered is whether benefits do provide adequate protection against poverty and whether it is possible to find evidence of strengthened income protection for Europe"s elderly.
The chapter is structured as follows. Section two provides a short introduction to the large differences in pension systems across the European Union, which form the context of the minimum income guarantees targeted at the elderly. Section three focuses on the different types of minimum income guarantees which are available to Europe"s elderly from the perspective of the mode of access. Subsequently, section four elaborates on trends and levels of non-contributory minimum income guarantees. The chapter ends with a concluding discussion.
Old-age pension schemes in the EU
The importance, role and organisation of non-contributory minimum income guarantees of the elderly cannot be understood independently from the broader context of social protection, not the least since the development and role of various kinds of contributory pension benefits varies substantially in Europe (for an historical account, see Palme, 1990; and Overbye, 1997) . For instance, in the Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries the public pension system mainly consists of a substantial pension guaranteed to all citizens from a certain age, regardless of past contributions, either as a principal component or as a topup to other pension income. In addition, some earnings-related public and/or collective pensions are included in the mandatory part of the pension system 2 (cf. Anderson, 2007: 726-729; Anderson and Immergut, 2007: 362-366; Green-Pedersen, 2007: 466-470; Kangas, 2007: 268-273 ). With such a pension system, there could be only a limited role for the general social assistance scheme or other targeted meanstested minimum income benefits. The situation is different in countries with relatively low contributory flat-rate public pensions, such as the United Kingdom and Ireland, where the level of pensions depends on the number of years (weeks) one has contributed. Since earnings-related pensions which complement the flat-rate pension scheme are accessible only for people with sufficient earnings, means-tested benefits tend to play an important role for a substantial part of the elderly population (cf. Schulze and Moran, 2007a: 770-775; 2007b: 60-66; Van Mechelen et al., 2011: 12-13 ). Yet another situation can be found in the socalled "Bismarckian" countries in which -traditionally -earnings-related pensions form the core of the public pension system and are organised along socio-professional categories (with some groups in the population benefiting from considerably more favourable pension arrangements than others). In most of these countries, earnings-related pensions provide substantial pension income, with guaranteed minimum pensions for its beneficiaries often depending on the socio-professional category and number of years one has contributed to the public pension scheme. As a result, means-tested minimum incomes remain relevant especially for those without a sufficient contribution record (or derived rights), but much less so for pensioners benefiting from a public pension. Typical examples are Belgium, Italy, Poland and Portugal Over the past 20 years, many public pension schemes have been reformed. In some countries, such as Estonia, Latvia Hungary and Poland public pensions have been partially privatised 4 (cf. European Commission, 2005) . At the same time, in countries such as Italy, Sweden Poland and Latvia, public defined benefit schemes have been replaced with notional defined contribution schemes (Williamson, 2004) . To the extent that this will lead to lower public pensions for persons with relatively low life-time earnings, means-tested minimum incomes can be expected to grow in importance if not matched by better coverage and benefit levels of occupational and individual private pension schemes (cf. Whitehouse et al., 2009; and European Commission, 2010d on the projected evolution of replacement rates). Of course, the role of minimum income schemes is not only determined by the composition of the pension system, but also by other factors such as the indexation of old age pension benefits in payment (e.g. Whitehouse, 2009 ), generational differences in economic opportunities, and the wider availability of public goods and services.
Minimum income guarantees for Europe's elderly
In spite of very large differences in the overall set up of European pension systems, in every EU member state at least some regulation can be found to guarantee a minimum income to the elderly, be it as a part of the pension system or as a part of the general social assistance scheme, be it with, or without a means test. Table 1 presents a schematic overview of five different types of minimum income guarantees targeted at Europe"s elderly. The distinction between different minimum income guarantees is based on two important entitlement criteria which co-define the mode of access to a scheme: (1) whether access is dependent on past contributions or not, and (2) the type of means testing which is applied 5 . The focus of this chapter is on the cells shaded in grey: the non-contributory minimum income schemes. In addition to the income guarantees targeted at the elderly, in some countries the general social assistance scheme remains relevant for guaranteeing a minimum income to the elderly. A detailed overview by country of the available minimum income guarantees is provided in Table 2 . More precisely, in the European Union the following minimum income guarantees are available to the elderly:
1) A minimum pension is a minimum benefit paid to pensioners who satisfy some conditions in relation to a minimum insurance or contribution record. It is not dependent on a means test and consists either of a flat-rate amount as part of the pension formula (cf. minimum pension (a) in Table 1 ), or of an amount higher than what could be granted if the general pension formula would be simply applied (cf. minimum pension (b) in Table 1 ). The level of the minimum pension may be dependent on the number of years (months) of insurance. This regulation can be organised as a separate scheme in the public pension system 6 , or it can be part of a broader earnings-related or contribution-related public pension scheme 7 . Conditions and availability of a minimum pension may not be the same for all pensioners if the pension system comprises separate schemes for different socio-economic groups.
2) A pension supplement is an amount paid in addition to the main public pension. It is dependent on the contribution record and a means or income test, which does not only take account of the public pension received, but also of other income sources (possibly including income from other household members). A pension supplement is available in Austria, Cyprus (since December 2009), Greece (except for farmers), Italy and Slovenia.
Both minimum pensions and pension supplements do not offer a genuine guaranteed minimum income to all residents of a country. In both cases a minimum contribution record (or number of qualifying years) is necessary to benefit from the scheme and the level of the benefit may also be determined by the number of qualifying years. Nevertheless, it should be noted that in a large number of countries many periods out of work also count as qualifying years. Generally, this is the case of periods during which one received an unemployment benefit or an allowance for maternity (paternity) or parental leave. In some countries also other periods are taken into account (e.g. for higher education, childcare, or care for a disabled person) (cf. European Commission, 2010c). Especially if employment is relatively widespread, this may result in an effective guaranteed minimum for the great majority of the population (for instance, this seems to be the case in Luxembourg).
In the great majority of EU member states the elderly are protected by non-contributory minimum income guarantees which can be granted from a certain age, usually the legal retirement age. These minimum income guarantees are not dependent on a minimal contribution record. Three different types of noncontributory minimum income schemes can be discerned:
3) In Denmark and the Netherlands a basic pension is provided to all persons aged 65 and over. In both countries, the benefit level depends on the number of years one has resided in the country 8 . In contrast to all other minimum income guarantees discussed in this section, the basic pension schemes in Denmark and the Netherlands form the cornerstone of the overall public pension system (e.g. Overbye, 1997) . 4) In five EU member states a conditional basic pension is available for the elderly. This is the case of Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Sweden and -for persons aged 80 and over -the United Kingdom. Apart from residence conditions, eligibility is also "pension-tested". In other words, it serves as a top-up to other (contributory) pensions. Usually, the amount does not vary by other sources of income. 5) Almost all other EU member states provide a means-tested minimum income targeted at the elderly. In most cases eligibility and the amount of the benefit are not dependent on conditions of residence. Rather, with some exceptions, in these schemes the amount of the benefit is equal to the difference between the threshold of the means test and the part of the household"s income that is taken into account. There are very large differences between means tests. In some cases they only refer to income, in others to income and wealth; in some cases the means of all household members (or even other relatives) are taken into account whereas in others only the resources of the claimant are scrutinized. Sometimes with residence history conditions (Slovenia, Spain), in other countries not (e.g. Belgium). In most cases it concerns a scheme integrated into the general social assistance scheme, but with some specific conditions for the elderly. In others (e.g. Belgium, Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Latvia and Malta) it is rather part of the public pension system. Finally, in all countries which do not provide a guaranteed minimum income, a general social assistance scheme is available (Czech Republic, Luxemburg, Poland and Romania). In all four member states, this scheme is financed by taxes. Until April 2009, Romania was the only member state in which the general social assistance scheme was the only source to guarantee a minimum income to the elderly. Since then, also Romania has introduced a minimum pension. Of course, in almost all EU member states a social assistance scheme is present, but in member states where special arrangements for the elderly exist, this scheme is in most cases irrelevant, except for specific groups such as migrants with a limited residence history.
In many countries, the schemes listed in this section are not the only source of a minimum income guarantee to the elderly. In fact, the living standard of the elderly is also determined by the broader context of the welfare state. Among others this includes taxation; associated rights; the availability of subsidised goods and services to all inhabitants, the elderly in general or just the category of benefit recipients; benefits offered by related schemes such as disability and survivors" pensions; as well as housing benefits. Besides taxation and housing benefits, these alternative schemes available for the elderly are not covered in this chapter. Notes: In some cases a minimum pension is only provided to one or several socio-professional groups and not to all the insured, in that case the socio-professional groups covered by the minimum pension are indicated. In other cases all socio-professional groups can benefit from a minimum pension, but rules and/or benefit levels differ between groups ("Group-dependent"). For many countries, different sources regularly contradict each other. If necessary, the website of the relevant Ministry or responsible administration as well as national experts have been consulted. Specific notes: a In Austria social assistance is organised at the regional level, at least in Vienna there is a specific social assistance benefit for the elderly.
b The access to (but not the level of) the new Grants to pensioners" households with low income is dependent on having at least some public or occupational pension. Therefore, it can be considered to be a pension supplement rather than a means-tested minimum income. (2010); Matsaganis and Leventi (2011) and the questionnaires of the CSB-MIPI dataset (Van Mechelen et al., 2011) . Various sources contradict each other. If necessary the website of the relevant Ministry has been consulted. I would also like to thank Daniel Gerbery, Nataša Kump and Costas Stavrakis for providing me with further information on the minimum income protection system in respectively Slovakia, Slovenia and Cyprus.
Benefit levels: a look at the past 10 years
The generosity of benefits is not only determined by the accessibility of the scheme, but also by the level of protection it offers. Therefore, this section is devoted to trends in the level of minimum income protection schemes available to Europe"s elderly. The focus is on the main non-contributory minimum income scheme, which forms for the vast majority of the elderly the safety net of last resort. This section consists of three parts. In the first part, I elaborate on data and measurement issues related to the evaluation of levels and trends of minimum income benefits. Subsequently, I will discuss the evolution of gross benefit levels in the 2000s and the main reforms to the minimum income schemes. Even though gross benefits are very helpful to gain more insight into the evolution of minimum income schemes, they are not sufficient for understanding the real level of minimum income protection offered to the elderly in Europe: taxes, social contributions and housing benefits may substantially affect the final purchasing power of minimum income recipients. Therefore, in the third part of this section, I will illustrate the level and evolution of net minimum income packages which take account of both taxes and housing benefits, making use of the so-called model family approach.
data and measurement
As part of a project on the evolution of minimum income protection in Europe, the Herman Deleeck Centre for Social Policy (CSB) has compiled a dataset on the evolution of guaranteed minimum incomes for older people without sufficient resources. This dataset, the CSB Minimum Income Protection Indicators dataset (CSB-MIPI) contains information on all EU member states, except Cyprus and Malta, as well as three US states (Nebraska, New Jersey and Texas). A broad network of national experts has provided the necessary input for the data. A description of assumptions, procedures, strengths, weaknesses and an overview of the national experts involved in the project can be found in the appendix of this book. More details are provided in Van Mechelen et al. (2011) .
National experts had some freedom to choose which scheme is the typical "guaranteed minimum income for older people without sufficient resources". The underlined schemes listed in Table 2 correspond to those included in the CSB-MIPI database. Except for Bulgaria and Poland, these are the main noncontributory minimum income schemes targeted at the elderly (in terms of coverage and number of beneficiaries), which means that in countries where both means-tested minimum income schemes and (conditional) basic pensions are available, the latter have been included due to a more limited role of the fully means-tested benefits. In all countries, except Austria, a national scheme has been included. In the case of Austria, results refer to the region of Vienna. In half of the countries a means-tested minimum income for people of old age is included in the database. This is not the case for Denmark and the Netherlands (basic pension) as well as Estonia, Finland and Sweden (conditional basic pension). Furthermore, in some countries the general social assistance scheme has been included because there was no specific non-contributory guaranteed minimum income for the elderly (Czech Republic, Luxembourg, Romania and Slovakia) because minimum guaranteed income levels were lower than those of the general social assistance scheme (Slovenia) or because eligibility criteria of the means-tested minimum income were too strict (Lithuania before 2006). In the case of Bulgaria and Poland the minimum pension will be discussed, which is an important minimum income guarantee but cannot be regarded as a non-contributory guaranteed minimum income 9 . Nevertheless, in order to provide some information also on these countries, these schemes are also included in the discussion below. In other words, the role of the various minimum income schemes included in the analysis differs from country to country and is not fully comparable. This is also reflected in the number of beneficiaries: whereas in Denmark and the Netherlands close to 100 per cent of the elderly population benefits from the basic pension scheme, in Sweden and Finland conditional basic pensions are received by nearly 50 per cent of the elderly. In contrast, means-tested minimum incomes are received by around 20 per cent of the elderly population in Ireland and the United Kingdom. In most other countries less than 5 per cent of the elderly receive a benefit from the means-tested minimum income scheme, even though there are some exceptions (most in particular Portugal with 11.5 per cent of the elderly receiving a means-tested minimum income benefit) (Van Mechelen et al., 2011: 12-13 ).
For the model family simulations non-discretionary housing benefits have been included where applicable. Other non-discretionary cash or in-kind benefits have been left out of consideration. If applicable, account has been taken of income taxes, social contributions as well as local non-income taxes. As far as housing benefits are concerned, it has been assumed that the model families are renting an apartment with one bedroom at two-thirds of the national median rent. Given that assumptions with regard to rent do affect in some countries the level of housing benefits, it should be kept in mind that conclusions could somewhat differ if other housing costs would be assumed (Van Mechelen et al., 2011) . For the analysis that follows, it should be borne in mind that benefit levels refer to maximum benefit levels. In other words, we assume that beneficiaries have no other income, apart from those of the relevant scheme(s). Unfortunately, this means that we are not able to perceive changes in income or means tests, as long as they do not affect the maximum benefit people without other resources can receive.
The evolution of gross benefit levels
The evolution of gross benefit levels provided by non-contributory minimum income schemes can be influenced by several factors. First of all, in many countries official updating mechanisms are in place which differ from one country to another. As can be observed from Table 3 , indexation in line with increases in prices is most common. However, in several countries, indexation is primarily dependent upon ad-hoc government decisions (especially in Bulgaria and Lithuania). Second, on top of these, in some countries (e.g. Belgium, Austria (Vienna)) governments have pursued a deliberate policy of increases in minimum income benefits for elderly persons, beyond legislative obligations. Third, changes may occur due to policy reform either because the scheme has been changed (e.g. the Czech Republic) or replaced (e.g. Slovakia) or because other schemes have been changed or introduced which national experts deemed more important as a means of minimum income protection for the elderly (e.g. Lithuania). Fourth, gross benefit levels of couples could also change when the implicit equivalence scale changes. In that case it could be that the development of gross benefit levels for couples does not fully correspond to the evolution of the benefit levels for singles or other household types. European countries can be divided into three broad groups with regard to the real evolution of maximum gross benefit amounts 10 : countries in which gross benefit levels have roughly remained constant during the 2000s; another group of countries in which serious increases in gross benefit levels have taken place and a small group of countries in which gross benefits have declined in real terms over the past decade.
The first group consists of countries where gross benefits have not changed very much in real terms, in spite of some apparent differences between countries within this group. In France, gross benefit levels remained nearly constant over the past 10 years. Nonetheless, in January 2007 the old minimum vieillesse (which consisted of a number of schemes) has been replaced with a much simpler, unified scheme, at least for new beneficiaries. Whereas accessibility of the scheme has been restricted, the maximum level of the benefit has been left unchanged (cf. Augris and Bac, 2009: 25-26) . The evolution of gross benefit levels is similar in Italy and Luxembourg, apart from a small increase at the beginning of the decade. In contrast, the evolution of gross benefit levels in Austria and Germany has been marked with a "jump" of around 10 per cent in the mid-2000s. In Austria (Vienna) the increase was much less pronounced for singles and was entirely due to the indexation mechanism, which follows the indexation of public pensions. In Germany the means-tested minimum income for the elderly has been introduced in 2003. Nevertheless, the increase in benefit levels compared to the previous social assistance scheme is not due to this reform, which essentially relaxed the means test for elderly persons, without changing maximum gross benefit levels. Other patterns are observable in Finland, the Netherlands and Spain (gradual growth), Hungary (an inverted U-curve) as well as Denmark and Poland ("hesitant growth"). In Finland and Poland aboveinflation increases have been introduced regularly in the 2000s to keep up with increases in earningsrelated pensions, respectively increases in wages. In short, although in all these countries no big changes in benefit levels took place over the last decade, in most of them gross benefit levels increased between 5 and 15 percent in real terms. The second group of countries displays marked increases in gross benefit levels. This applies in particular to Romania, Lithuania, Portugal and Greece. In Romania general social assistance benefits first decreased by 35 percent in 2001, after which they tripled in constant prices. The decrease in 2001 was the last in a continuous yearly erosion of social assistance benefits after their introduction in 1995
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. However, since 2002 social assistance benefits have tended to erode again. If the introduction of the (contributory) minimum pension in 2009 could be counted as a replacement for many pensioners of the social assistance scheme as the guaranteed minimum income, gross benefit levels tripled again in 2009. Until 2006, in Lithuania eligibility conditions for the social pension were very narrowly defined (such as taking care of someone or have given birth to at least 5 children), therefore we assume that before 2006 most elderly without sufficient resources had to rely on the general social assistance scheme. From then on, eligibility conditions of the social pension have been relaxed substantially for all persons at retirement age who have 11 Even after the Sharp increase in gross benefit levels in 2002, their real value remained 30 percent lower than at the time they were first introduced in 1995. Similarly, the means-tested minimum income guarantees for the elderly in Greece and Portugal have been improved substantially during the 2000s. Dedicated to radically crack down on elderly poverty, the Portuguese government introduced a new means-tested minimum income in 2006 which provided the elderly with a minimum income guarantee twice as high as the Old-Age Social Pension introduced thirty years earlier (Chuliá and Asensio, 2007) . Starting with those aged 80 and over in 2006, accessibility rapidly broadened to those aged 65 and over in 2009. At the same time, gross benefit levels further increased. Greece started to substantially increase benefit levels of the non-contributory means-tested minimum income in the 1990s and continued to do so in the 2000s, resulting in benefit levels which doubled in 10 years time. As a result of the economic and fiscal crisis, it should be noted Greece is currently implementing radical reforms in pensions and minimum income guarantees (cf. Matsaganis and Leventi, 2011) .
Less spectacular increases, but nonetheless very large increases, can be found in Estonia and Latvia where gross benefit levels have increased between 70 respectively 80 percent compared to the beginning of the 2000s. In Estonia gross benefit levels increased year after year, whereas in Latvia benefit levels started to increase only in 2004. In Belgium, Slovenia, Sweden and the United Kingdom benefit levels have risen with around 40 percent during the 2000s. In Sweden and Slovenia benefit levels increased in the early 2000s after which they remained constant, whereas in Belgium and the UK benefit levels have increased gradually. In Estonia, Latvia and the United Kingdom increases are linked to the general indexation mechanism which takes to some extent account of wage growth. However, also the introduction of the Pension Credit (guarantee) in 2003 has contributed to the increase in the United Kingdom. Although minimum income guarantees for the elderly in Belgium and Slovenia are linked to prices and in Ireland are increased on a purely ad-hoc basis, exceptional increases have taken place that do not have their origins in substantial reforms. In Sweden, however, gross benefit levels increased sharply in 2003 as the result of a major reform. At that time, Sweden replaced the Folkpension (a kind of basic pension with conditional component) with a single conditional basic pension (the Garantipension). In contrast to the previous scheme, the Garantipension is subject to an income tax, which entirely offsets the steep increase in gross benefit levels in 2003. In only two countries benefit levels have decreased significantly during the 2000s: the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Both countries have radically reformed their social assistance schemes in the mid-2000s. As a result of these reforms (and the partial replacement of the social assistance scheme with a housing benefit in the Czech Republic), gross benefit levels dropped very strongly (see Chapter ...).
It can be concluded that in all countries except the Czech Republic and Slovakia gross benefit levels were in real terms at the same or even a higher level in 2009 than at the start of the decade. This does not necessarily mean that gross benefit levels kept up with the evolution of the average living standard in society. If compared to growth in the average gross wage, in most countries with very strong growth of gross benefits in real terms, benefit levels have increased (much) faster than the average gross wage. However, there are important exceptions such as Estonia and Latvia where increases in gross benefit levels were just sufficient to keep pace with very strong growth in the average wage. The other way around, in countries with relatively limited increases in real benefit levels (cf. Figure 1) , average wages grew more strongly than gross minimum income benefits, except for those countries in which average wages were marked by periods of no or only modest growth in real terms. Examples include Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Italy
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In most countries, the observed evolution of benefit levels in real terms is not the result of major reforms to the minimum income guarantees, but rather due to the available indexation mechanisms on the one hand and substantial ad-hoc increases on the other. There is no direct relation with the type of minimum income guarantee, both in terms of recent evolution and in terms of indexation mechanism applied: In the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Portugal, Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom as well as Romania major 13 Own calculations on the basis of CSB-MIPI data about average gross wages (Van Mechelen et al., 2011) . reforms have taken place and affected gross benefit levels. In Belgium, France and Germany important reforms have not directly led to large increases in gross benefit levels. As has been observed in the case of social assistance for the 1990s (Cantillon and Van Mechelen, 2003; Cantillon et al., 2004) and for public pensions in the second half of the 20 th century (Whitehouse, 2009) , the official indexation mechanism is only loosely linked to real changes in gross benefit levels. In almost all countries where indexation is based on increases in consumer prices, gross benefit levels have grown faster than inflation (e.g. Belgium, Finland, Poland). However, in the Czech Republic and Romania, in spite of indexation on the basis of prices, benefit levels have eroded from time to time during the 2000s. Similarly, in countries such as Denmark gross benefit levels decreased as a percentage of the average wage, even though benefits are indexed to wages.
Changes in the adequacy of net minimum income packages
If gross benefit levels have substantially increased in gross terms, the question arises whether, concomitantly, the adequacy of net minimum incomes has been improved during the 2000s. Two different kinds of factors mediate the relation between the observed trends in the previous paragraph and the adequacy of benefits: (1) changes in related schemes; and (2) changes in what could be considered an adequate minimum income. As far as the former set of factors is concerned, the evolution of gross benefit levels does not necessarily correspond to the evolution of the net disposable income of households living on these gross benefits. Changes in the taxes, social contributions or other benefit systems (such as nondiscretionary housing benefits), play an important role as well. Therefore, I will present some results of model family situations, which take these other factors into account. As it is assumed that people do not receive any other income, the effect of changes in and cross-national differences between means tests stay out of sight. Another factor affecting the adequacy of minimum incomes, consists of potential changes in what could be considered an adequate minimum income. In order to estimate what could be considered an adequate minimum income in the EU member states, I compare benefit levels with the so-called at-riskof-poverty thresholds which are often used in European poverty research and the EU Open Method of Coordination with regard to social inclusion. Of course, there could be a legitimate discussion about this yardstick (see Atkinson et al., 2002; Goedemé and Rottiers, 2011) . Nevertheless, it functions as an important poverty threshold at the European as well as the national level in many countries, and the ratio of minimum benefit levels and the at-risk-of-poverty threshold at least shows the potential redistributive capacity of the minimum income packages for elderly persons. The at-risk-of-poverty threshold is equal to 60 per cent of the median equivalised net disposable household income in each country. In order to compute the median income, household incomes have been divided by the equivalent household size for making income levels comparable across households size and composition using the modified OECDscale (for more details on the calculation, see Goedemé (2011) ; and for precision of estimates and crosstemporary comparability, see Van Mechelen et al. (2011: 39) ).
In order to illustrate the potential effect of related schemes on changes in net minimum income packages, Figure 3 depicts the weight of the various income components in the total income package for an elderly couple in June 2009 14 . In nine countries, the income package consists only of the minimum income guarantee. Surprisingly, in three countries (Latvia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic) the housing benefit comprises more or less half of the total income package, which means that it is at least as important for guaranteeing a minimum living standard to people without other resources as the income from social assistance (Slovakia and the Czech Republic) or the State Social Security benefit in Latvia. Please note that in a number of countries (e.g. Germany and Sweden), the level of housing benefits is strongly dependent on assumptions regarding housing costs. As a result, both the total net minimum income and the share of the housing benefit in this income may be higher if higher housing costs would be assumed. In addition to housing benefits, the level of net minimum incomes is also determined by taxes and social contributions. In half of the EU member states covered by CSB-MIPI, elderly persons on a minimum income guarantee have to pay local or other non-income taxes. In Denmark, Greece, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden income taxes and/or social contributions have to be paid, which are particularly high in Denmark and Sweden. In contrast, in Austria, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Slovenia, no taxes or social contributions are levied on gross benefits. Luxembourg recently introduced a negative income tax for social assistance recipients, but it is lower than the social security contributions and local taxes which have to be paid. Taxes and social contributions reach a substantial level especially in countries with a basic pension or a conditional basic pension, however there is no straightforward link between the type of minimum income guarantee and the overall composition of the minimum income package. How has the adequacy of non-contributory net minimum income guarantees evolved between 2000 and 2010 if we sum up all income components and take account of changes in gross minimum income levels, the tax system as well as non-discretionary housing benefits? In order to gain more insight into this question, Figure 4 depicts equivalent net minimum income packages for an elderly couple as a percentage of the national median equivalent net disposable household income, both for 2001 and 2009. Please note that the underlying data on median disposable incomes is not fully comparable across time and a small margin of statistical error should be taken into account (Van Mechelen et al., 2011) 15 . Results presented in Figure 4 indicate that at the end of the 2000s, in most countries net non-contributory minimum income benefits for elderly couples were below the poverty line (i.e. 60% of the median), albeit in one third of countries, net minimum income packages were not far below 60% of median incomes. Nevertheless, 15 For most countries, observed trends are similar if net minimum income packages would be compared to the net income of a couple at active age living on average male and average female earnings. Exceptions are Estonia and Spain (stronger growth than net average wages but weaker growth than the median equivalent net disposable household income), the Netherlands (stronger growth than median equivalent net disposable household income, but weaker growth than net average wages. For Denmark, the drop in adequacy is much less pronounced if net minimum income packages would be compared to net average wages. taxes and social contributions net disposable income differences are very large, ranging from 19 percent of median income in Romania to close to 80 per cent in Portugal. Over the past 10 years, in more or less half of the countries net minimum income packages have lost ground to the median net disposable household income, with drops in Denmark, France, Sweden as well as the Polish minimum pension, bringing net disposable incomes on or below the poverty line. During the same period, in Portugal, Greece, Belgium, the United Kingdom and Ireland the adequacy of net minimum income seems to have been substantially increased, even though -except for Portugal -not sufficiently to lift them above the at-risk-of-poverty threshold. Please note that, due to changing implicit equivalence scales, in some countries the trend for elderly singles is not exactly the same as for couples. In fact, between 2001 and 2009 the minimum net income package of singles grew faster than that of couples in Latvia, the United Kingdom, Finland, Germany, and Italy. In contrast, in Austria, Slovakia and particularly Estonia, net minimum incomes of couples grew faster than those of singles, meaning that the adequacy of minimum income benefits of elderly persons living alone has decreased even more than the decline observed for couples. Similarly, cross-national differences in implicit equivalence scales also mean that the ranking of countries is not entirely the same in the case of minimum income guarantees for single persons. However, broadly, conclusions are the same. Finally, it is worth mentioning that also in the case of benefit adequacy, there is no clear-cut relation between the mode of access of minimum income schemes and the level of benefits, mainly due to the large variation in benefit levels of means-tested minimum income schemes targeted at the elderly. A relatively common belief is that in spite of large differences in purchasing power of net minimum income schemes from a cross-national perspective, benefit levels would diverge much less in terms of the average living standard in each country. As far as non-contributory minimum income schemes for the elderly are concerned, this assumption is confirmed for both 2001 and 2009: in both years the crossnational differences in relative minimum income levels are much more limited than the differences in absolute levels of purchasing power of minimum income packages. power than a similar couple living on social assistance in Romania. In contrast, if compared to the national median income, in Luxembourg an elderly couple received about 50 per cent of the median net disposable household income, whereas in Romania this figure amounted to around 19 per cent, in relative terms only about 2.6 times less than their Luxembourgish counterparts. Nevertheless, it should be worrying that there is a relatively strong correlation between the relative and absolute purchasing power of net minimum income packages: in countries with relatively limited net minimum income guarantees in absolute terms, the purchasing power of these minimum income packages tends to be also low in relative terms (i.e. in comparison with the national median equivalent net disposable household income). There are some important exceptions, such as Portugal in 2009 and Luxembourg. Finally, it is remarkable to see how absolute and relative levels of minimum income packages have somewhat converged between 2001 and 2009, with -except for Portugal -at the top-end of the distribution countries forming a rather homogeneous cluster both in terms of absolute and in terms of relative benefit levels. Figure 5 illustrates these observations for elderly couples. On the Y-axis the same figures appear as in Figure 4 , whereas on the X-axis the absolute purchasing power is expressed as a percentage of the year-specific EU average, taking account of price level differences between countries. 
Conclusion
At the close of the first decade of the new millennium, in all EU member states elderly persons can rely on at least one kind of minimum income guarantee. However, the kind of minimum income guarantees available to the elderly differ widely across countries. On the basis of the "mode of access", apart from "general social assistance", one can make a distinction between minimum pensions, pension supplements, basic pensions, conditional basic pensions and means-tested minimum incomes targeted at the elderly. Not only does the set of available minimum income guarantees differ across countries, but also the number of beneficiaries and the level of income protection it offers.
In order to gain some insight into the trends and levels of non-contributory minimum income guarantees, the new CSB-MIPI data have been analysed. These data show that except for Slovakia and the Czech Republic gross benefit levels have remained constant, or have grown in real terms over the past 10 years. In fact, in a good deal of countries increases have been larger than what could be expected of legislated indexation mechanisms. In some cases this is due to substantial reforms. However in many other countries increases have been ad hoc without substantially changing the system, indicating that in an important number of EU member states governments have been committed to reducing poverty in old-age. Nonetheless, net disposable incomes of the elderly living on minimum income guarantees varies greatly across Europe, both in absolute and in relative terms. Several countries (Portugal, Greece, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Belgium) substantially increased minimum income levels for the elderly, even in comparison with the average rise in living standards. At the same time, in one third of the countries included in this study, the potential to lift the elderly above the threshold has probably decreased, and in some countries quite severely so. If minimum income schemes really are to become more important for avoiding poverty in old age in the future, many governments still have a long way to go in order to ensure a decent living standard to all members of their elderly population.
Nevertheless, in times of unbalanced government budgets and limited resources for improving social protection, the question arises whether these resources should not be directed in first place to the general social assistance scheme (or the scheme targeted at the persons at active age), given that benefit levels are in most countries even lower than those for the elderly (see chapter X). Of course, for the population at active age the consideration of work incentives also a plays a role (which is no longer an issue for persons above the legal retirement age). Nonetheless, the question could be asked whether adequacy is not of primary importance, especially if it concerns households with children or persons which are -even with accompanying activation measures -not meaningfully employable.
